Tuesday, 16 July 2013

The Early and Unlamented Deaths of ss. 90 and 120.1:Government takes quick action on parental support and unmarried persons' property agreements

I've had the opportunity to take a more in depth reading of the transitional and repeal provisions of the Family Law Act, largely as a result of some issues brought to my attention by Nate Russell of Courthouse Libraries BC.

The nuts and bolts of the new Family Law Act run from ss. 1 to 244. The government's power to make the host of new regulations the act will require runs from ss. 245 to 249. The transitional provisions — the sections which guide the changes from the old Family Relations Act to the new Family Law Act — are brief and run from ss. 250 to 256. The really dry stuff, about the other laws that will be changed or repealed to accommodate the new act run from s. 257 all the way through to s. 482 and are dreadfully dry reading. This is, however, where you can find the really interesting things which motivated the call from Nate.

At the end of the act, further to s. 482, is a table showing which parts of the act come into force upon the act receiving Royal Assent which will come into force down the road by Order in Council. As readers will recall, the Attorney General has announced that implementation of the act will take 12 to 18 months. However, a close look at the table shows that some parts of the act will come into effect the moment the bill receives Royal Assent, two or three days after it clears Third Reading, and won't need to wait for the eventual Order in Council. (Read my post "The Present Effect of the Proposed Family Law Act" for a brief discussion about how a bill becomes law.) An acquaintance at the Attorney General's office has confirmed that this is indeed the intention behind s. 482.

Apart from some minor housekeeping changing references to "husband and wife" to "spouse," the provisions coming into effect right away will:
  • make the Land (Spouse Protection) Act available to unmarried spouses,
  • repeal the provisions of the Family Relations Act for parental support (s. 90), and
  • repeal other provisions relating to the effect of property agreements between unmarried couples (s. 120.1).
The last point is the most important, I think, although frankly the repeal of parental support is a close runner up. (Read my post "Parental Support in British Columbia" for an explanation of this subject.)
If you go back to my post "Why you DON'T want a cohabitation agreement," you'll see a long explanation about how s. 120.1 made the property rules applicable to married couples applicable to unmarried couples who had the misfortune to make an agreement about property. This meant that cohabitation agreements were usually very bad for the person owning property, as they could produce a far worse result than the worst case result without an agreement.
The repeal of s. 120.1 now means that unmarried couples can go ahead and enter into property agreements now before the rest of the Family Law Act comes into effect without getting caught by the unexpected and frankly counterintuitive consequences of s. 120.1. In other words, unmarried couples can make an agreement now to avoid the property sharing provisions of the new act without worrying about the negative consequences of the old act.
My thanks again to Nate for pointing this out.

Monday, 15 July 2013

The Other Side of the "Sham" Marriage

The BBC has posted a great article about the burgeoning "wedding detective" trade in India, where there are apparently around 15,000 businesses willing to investigate a potential bride or groom. Most of the time these folks will be hired by the bride's family to investigate the groom and authenticate family status, verify income and capital assets, check for other wives or a history of infidelity, and verify sexual orientation. Says the BBC:
"The vast majority of enquiries come from parents who want to assess the 'character' of their future son-in-law ...
"The nature and scope of investigation depends on the moral or cultural values of parents. Someone from a more traditional Indian family might want to check up on whether a bride or groom drinks or smokes.
"Others might be keener to learn whether there are any past relationships, something which can still be frowned upon in India. Conducting a review of a groom's financial dealings and business assets is also common."
Because it is still fairly common for the bride to move in with her in-laws after marriage investigations can sometimes address the character of the potential mother in law:
"'We study the mother-in-law,' says [one detective]. 'How many times does she get angry, how many times does she throws the vessels out, how many times does she go shopping, what does she spend her money on. We understand everything about her and then put it in writing.'"
If only I'd known. Apparently, these investigations can become extraordinarily elaborate, involving "spy cameras hidden in watches, key chains, lockets and shirt buttons," complicated ruses and creative disguises:
"It is normal practice for [another detective] to wear disguises. He dresses as beggars, watchmen and drivers to gain access to a subject's house and life. There is no limit to what persona he might take on. [The detective] once posed as a pimp, after the parents asked for a 'honey trap' test."
Now, detectives are also hired in matrimonial matters in Canada, however here it's usually on an after-the-fact basis... or so I thought. For example, the oddly-named Deception Investigations claims to specialize in "domestic and matrimonial issues" and will surreptitiously investigate your beloved to determine whether he or she is having an affair, hiding assets and so forth, and also offers to chase people down who are in arrears of support. Much the same services are offered by Shadow Investigations and Advanced Surveillance Group.

However, reading Deception's website more closely reveals that they also offer "pre-marital screening." Another company, Surrey Private Investigator, offers the same sort of service under the curious heading "Relationship Investigations:"
"Does your lover have a secret past? Before you become involved with a person, you may decide to conduct a pre-relationship investigation for the purpose of looking into the background of the person with whom you share romantic interests or plan to marry. Isn't it important that you know if they are really who they say they are."
The website of Pinnacle Investigations is much more detailed about the services they offer:
"... A thorough back check is the key to making the right decisions when entering into new relationships where even the slightest suspicions are encountered. ... We conduct property searches, bankruptcy and judgment searches, lien searches, lifestyle checks and mystery shopping. ..."
Now, I can guess what "lifestyle check" is code for, but "mystery shopping" baffles me unless your fiancé or fiancée is a prostitute. Interestingly, Golden West Investigative Group takes a less literate, darker perspective on pre-marital inquiries, and seems to adopt the groom's perspective:
"When entering a partnership relationship (proposed marriage), there are times that one of the parties may be coming into the new marriage with considerably more assets than the other. It is becoming more common to have pre-nuptial agreements in such cases. It is also becoming more common for the party with the greater asset base to hire a firm like Golden West Investigative Group Ltd to conduct a thorough investigation and surveillance to make sure that everything is on the up and up before the marriage occurs. This may sound like a lack of trust but some people have enough assets to be an EASY MARK for a few unscrupulous people. It is sad... but so true in today's world of wealthy entrepreneurs. If you are entering a new relationship, be sure you know who your other future half really is."
It seems that the cultural background which makes the BBC story so charming isn't so far off from the values of the cynical but engaged in British Columbia!

Saturday, 13 July 2013

Supreme Court Releases Important Decision on Lump Sum Spoual Support

The Supreme Court has just released its judgment in Robinson v. Robinson, a case in which the parties had resolved everything on their own except for how spousal support should be paid and how much should be paid. The husband's liability to pay spousal support was admitted, however the wife wanted to receive spousal support in one large payment (a lump sup) or as a mix of monthly payments (periodic payments) and a lump sum; the husband preferred to meet his obligation by way of periodic payments.

Under s. 15.2(1) of the Divorce Act, the court may "make an order requiring a spouse to secure or pay, or to secure and pay, such lump sum or periodic sums, or such lump sum and periodic sums, as the court thinks reasonable." The Family Relations Act says almost the same thing at s. 93(5).

Periodic payments are the most common form of spousal support. Periodic payments allow the payor and the recipient to make stable financial plans, and have the benefit of being tax-deductible for the payor. Periodic payments are also usually more affordable for the payor since few people have the cash lying around to make a large lump sum payment.

On the other hand, lump sum payments are attractive to payors who want to have done with their obligation and don't relish the thought of cutting a cheque each month to someone they're no longer very fond of. Recipients sometimes like the idea of a lump sum payment if the money will allow them to invest in a business or pay for education that will help them get back on their feet. Although lump sum payments aren't tax-deductible for payors, they're also not taxable income for recipients.

In the case of the Robinson family, by the time the case came to trial the husband was in his fifties, with a good income in the low six figures and living overseas with his new partner, and in recent years had suffered a number of heart attacks and a stroke requiring hospitalization. Quoting from the judgment, the wife sought a lump sum for the following reasons:
"[81] The wife is now [in her fifties]. She is unable to become and remain economically independent and self-sufficient without ongoing financial assistance from the husband. She seeks an order that the husband pay ongoing spousal support for an indefinite period. However, because of his past behaviour, and in order to terminate all contact with the husband, she seeks an order that the spousal support be paid in a lump sum.
"[82] The wife submits that both parties would benefit from a clean break, since they continue to have a difficult, stormy relationship and poor communication, which has not improved after many years. ...
"[83] She cites a number of other incidents of miscommunication and discord between the parties regarding financial matters, including: the withdrawal of funds from the parties’ joint account; the concern over the payment of ___ funds; and the situation regarding the purchase of the ___ condominium.
"[84] It is the submission of the wife that as the relationship between the parties has been strained since 20__ and became increasingly more difficult until the separation in 20__, and since the communication between the parties remains minimal and difficult, the clean break afforded by a lump sum payment is the appropriate form of spousal support in her circumstances.
"[85] The wife deposes that the wait each month to see whether funds will be forthcoming exacerbates her [illness], and she believes the stress and anxiety have a negative impact on her [illness]. A lump sum will alleviate this concern."
The husband sought to pay on a periodic basis and said that a lump sum would be inappropriate for these reasons:
"[88] The husband submits that periodic payments of spousal support are appropriate in these circumstances since a lump sum payment is made only in exceptional circumstances.
"[89] ... The husband is aware of no medical condition which would preclude the wife from taking employment, either in the past or currently. She has means, including her ability to earn income. The husband has consistently encouraged the wife to take either course work or find employment, but she has refused to do so.
"[90] On the basis of the circumstances of this case and the case law submitted, the husband submits that the wife should use her capital to generate income, as that capital is already available as a result of a reapportionment of the family assets. Means includes the ability to earn an income both personally and from one’s capital.
"[91] This is not a case where the husband can make back the capital [which a lump sum payment would require him to spend], since his income is now reduced from previous years’ income. ... She does not have a one-time need for additional capital.
"[92] Enforceability is not an issue in this matter, as the husband has an excellent record of [paying] spousal support."
The trial judge began her analysis by quoting from an appeal case out of Ontario released earlier this year, Davis v. Crawford (I've put the important bits in bold):
"[66] Most importantly, a court considering an award of lump sum spousal support must weigh the perceived advantages of making a lump sum award in the particular case against any presenting disadvantages of making such an order.
"[67] The advantages of making such an award will be highly variable and case-specific. They can include but are not limited to: terminating ongoing contact or ties between the spouses for any number of reasons (for example: short-term marriage; domestic violence; second marriage with no children, etc.); providing capital to meet an immediate need on the part of a dependant spouse; ensuring adequate support will be paid in circumstances where there is a real risk of non-payment of periodic support, a lack of proper financial disclosure or where the payor has the ability to pay lump sum but not periodic support; and satisfying immediately an award of retroactive spousal support.
"[68] Similarly, the disadvantages of such an award can include: the real possibility that the means and needs of the parties will change over time, leading to the need for a variation; the fact that the parties will be effectively deprived of the right to apply for a variation of the lump sum award; and the difficulties inherent in calculating an appropriate award of lump sum spousal support where lump sum support is awarded in place of ongoing indefinite periodic support.
"[69] In the end, it is for the presiding judge to consider the factors relevant to making a spousal support award on the facts of the particular case and to exercise his or her discretion in determining whether a lump sum award is appropriate and the appropriate quantum of such an award."
Considering these factors, the judge concluded that the wife should receive the lump sum she sought: "lump sum spousal support will assist the wife to be self-sufficient and meet her needs to maintain her standard of living with use of the capital from the lump sum together with the capital achieved in the division and reapportionment of the family assets " and "the advantages of a clean break outweigh the minimal tax benefit of periodic payments in addition to a lump sum."

The question then turned to the calculation of amount, one of the main problems with lump sum orders identified in the Davis decision. After restating the relevant provisions of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (ss. 3.4.2, 7.1, 10.1 and 10.2), the court reviewed a number of of the more important cases on the subject. Again quoting from the judgment:
  • As stated in Smith v. Smith [a 2006 case of the B.C. Supreme Court] ... "the present value of a periodic support stream in favour of Mr. Smith until Ms. Huntley attains age 65 would approximate $105,000, $123,000 and $140,000 at the low, mid and high points, respectively, of the range suggested by the draft guidelines. Allowing for income tax at an average rate of 30%, the after-tax present value amounts would approximate $70,000, $82,000 and $93,000, respectively. The reapportionment I have ordered, based as it was on markedly different income-earning capacity, accounts for approximately $50,000 of the present value of the future support stream."
  • In Wilson v. Wilson ... a 1997 decision of the B.C. Court of Appeal, the lump sum award was in an amount "equal to the present value" of the monthly payment.
  • In the case of Raymond v. Raymond ... decided by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in 2008, the calculation of lump sum spousal support took into account the net amount of the mid-range figure from the SSAG, less 6% to represent the present value of the lump sum payment, and less 50% to take into account future contingencies.
  • In Durakovic v. Durakovic, ... also a 2008 decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, the lump sum entitlement was calculated by using a monthly figure extrapolated for the number of months remaining in entitlement, less 30% for income tax payable, less 3% for present value, less 25% for negative contingencies which was noted to be "lower than other cases as there are only two years left to run on the calculation of the lump sum."
To summarize, then, in calculating a lump sum amount, the court can take into account:
  1. the ranges proposed by the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines formulas;
  2. the tax consequences periodic payments would have attracted (a deduction to account for the tax the recipient would have owed on periodic payments);
  3. the decreasing value of the dollar over time (another deduction); and,
  4. the possibility of future changes which would have reduced the amount of the periodic payment (another deduction).
Applying these factors to a very learned understanding of the fine details of the Advisory Guidelines (and, I believe, her own calculations), the judge concluded:
"[123] An appropriate amount of monthly support is a starting point in the calculation of the lump sum.
"[124] With income of the wife of ___, support payable for 9 and one-half years, and the husbands’ accurate income and age of ___, the SSAG range of monthly payments provided by the computer application is $5,156, low, $6,016, mid, and $6,875, high.
"[125] The Without Child Support Formula ... provides for a range from 1.5% to 2% of the difference between the spouses’ gross incomes for each year of marriage up to a maximum of 50%. Taking 1.5% to 2% of the income difference results in a range of $5,755 to $7,633.
"[126] However, the maximum under the Formula is 50% of the income difference, which is $6,851.
"[127] Taking into account the Formula and the maximum, and the computer application of the Formula, the range is $5,156 to $6,851 per month. Taking into account the totality of the circumstances, I would determine monthly spousal support at the mid-point of this range or $6,000 per month as a starting point for calculation of the lump sum.
"[128] The lump sum calculations provided by the computer application of the Formula do not provide an appropriate result in this case where there is a restructuring of support ... to arrive at a lump sum. This is an example of an exception ... where the 'formula outcomes, even after consideration of restructuring, will not generate results consistent with the support objectives and factors under the Divorce Act.' ... [The] computer applications provide a reference point but an award that meets the requirements of the Divorce Act and Family Relations Act requires another method of calculation.
"[129] I prefer the method illustrated by the cases of Wilson, Durakovic, Raymond, and Smith, which take into account in various manners the factors of relative tax situations, an appropriate discount rate for the present value, and a contingency rate where necessary. In this case where the health of the payor spouse is subject to a heart condition which has required quadruple bypass surgery and continues to require medication, a significant contingency adjustment is required as there is a real possibility that the husband will not be able to continue to work until his planned retirement date.
"[130] There are 9 and one-half years or 114 months remaining for the payment of spousal support from December 2011, for a total of $684,000. From this gross amount, I would deduct tax which would be payable by the wife at an assumed rate of 35%. The discount rate for present value is 7%. To that amount I apply a contingency discount of 20%. The net amount is $330,782.
"[131] I find that the wife is entitled to lump sum spousal support in the amount of $330,000."
I expect this will be required reading for some time for cases involving not just the payment of spousal support as a lump sum, but the calculation of the lump sum when such an order is made.

I also appreciate and ask readers to note the judge's careful reading of the Advisory Guidelines. The Advisory Guidelines is very detailed and offers a nuanced range of exceptions and restructuring opportunities intended to help the formulas adapt to better suit complicated and unusual situations; too often lawyers overlook that deeper analysis and churn out calculations that don't consider these other options.

Friday, 12 July 2013

Wait, that's not spam, you've been summoned for jury duty!

Bill 15, the Attorney General and Public Safety and Solicitor General Statutes Amendment Act, 2011, was tabled in the Legislature for first reading today. Among other things, the briefly-titled bill would amend s. 11(2) of the Jury Act to allow the sheriff to summon jurors for criminal trials by email.

Given the proliferation of phishing scams, it seems more likely than not that a potential juror would assume the sheriff's email was spam or a scam of some sort. Make a mental note: before you hit the delete key, double-check to make sure that the email isn't legitimate. You may be fined if you don't show up!

Read the Attorney General's press release on the new bill.

Access Pro Bono Launches New Website

Access Pro Bono, the organization formed in 2010 by the merger of the Western Canada Society to Access Justice and Pro Bono Law of British Columbia, has just launched a fantastic new website at www.accessprobono.ca, thanks to funding from the Legal Services Society, the agency which provides legal aid in British Columbia. The new site is very user-friendly and easy to navigate.

According to the executive director, Jamie Maclaren, Access Pro Bono
"...made a conscious decision to focus the new site on the pro bono legal services that we offer to low-income British Columbians and how to access them, rather than the ins and outs of our organization...
"Today's launched version of the site is Phase 1 of our ongoing web development project. We will be adding more dynamic elements and more resources to the site in subsequent phases, including CLE-TV programs for pro bono lawyers, greater integration with Clicklaw, more BC-based legal resources, more videos introducing our many programs and projects, and better web-based access to our services."
The new site is quite sharp and worth a visit.

Thursday, 11 July 2013

Federal Government Cracking Down on Sham Marriages

The Globe & Mail today reports that Citizenship and Immigration Canada is working on a plan to reduce the number of marriages entered into for immigration purposes; the Globe article specifically mentions India and China as target countries where fraudulent marriage schemes are common. According to the Globe, regulations to be published later this year will allow Citizenship and Immigration to issue "a new 'conditional' immigration status," which I assume would be a conditional sponsorship approval, and limit sponsoring spouses to one new spouse every five years.

Marriage fraud has been on Citizenship and Immigration's radar for a number of years. Here's an extract from a speech delivered by immigration minister Jason Kenney at a golf club in India on 9 September 2010:
"We aim to reunite our citizens and permanent residents with family members and we recognize that most individuals who apply for family reunification are in genuine relationships.
"But we also aim to protect the integrity of our immigration system and uphold our laws by identifying and addressing fraudulent activity. This includes ensuring that fraudulent marriages are discovered and not used to circumvent our laws.
"Accordingly, if we find evidence during the sponsorship process that individuals are committing marriage fraud, we can and will refuse the application for permanent residence.
"Our officials at missions here and around the world are trained to assess relationships based on customs, traditions and practices of the specific cultures in which they work.
"I can assure you that the Government of Canada is working to limit abuse and fraud, and we will not be limiting immigration to Canada or the protection Canada provides to refugees."
Concerns like these led the ministry to undertake a series of public consultations later that year, the results of which have been published on Citizenship and Immigration's website and include recommendations for a conditional immigration status and limiting the frequency with which new spouses can be sponsored. Here is the summary conclusion drawn from the consultations, with emphasis added:
"In sum, those who participated in the consultation acknowledged concern about marriages of convenience. Most considered the issue to be a threat to the integrity of Canada’s immigration system, and the majority expressed a need for greater public education and awareness. A strong majority felt that the sponsor should bear considerable personal responsibility for ensuring that they were entering into a genuine relationship.
"Of the suggested measures proposed to address marriages of convenience, the leading option was for punishment of individuals found to be committing fraud (i.e. deportation, fines, legal action). Respondents also strongly supported increased investigative or screening measures, while just over half indicated that they were not prepared to tradeoff [sic] longer processing times for more investigations into potential cases of fraud. There was broad support for both the introduction of a sponsorship bar and for a conditional measure. For a conditional measure, the appropriate length suggested by most was for two years or less, followed by moderate support for a period of three to five years."
I have no doubt that marriage fraud is a problem for the federal government inasmuch as it undermines the coherence and public policy objectives of the immigration system. It's also a serious problem when the sponsoring spouse is unaware that the marriage was undertaken for ulterior purposes — the discovery of the other spouse's motives can cause no small amount of financial and emotional harm; see the 2006 case of Raju v. Kumar as an example of the harm which can be wrought.
Update: 1 November 2011
CBC has published an article on the enforcement side of this issue, and reports that through "Project Honeymoon" the Canada Border Services Agency has opened 39 investigations into suspected cases of marriage fraud since 2008, resulting in seven charges and three (count 'em, three) convictions.
Could it be that the rate of marriage fraud simply isn't as high as the immigration minister suggests? Or is it simply a problem of needing sufficient staff to address an problem which is inherently difficult to investigate? According to the CBC:
"... the internal border agency documents — disclosed under the Access to Information Act — acknowledge the cases require considerable resources, and many never make it to court."

Wednesday, 10 July 2013

Court of Appeal Releases Decision on Standard of Reasons for Judgment

In a new decision, Shannon v. Shannon, the Court of Appeal discusses the adequacy of trial judges' reasons for judgment as a ground of appeal. "Reasons for judgment" are a judge's written decision about the facts of a case, the law which applies to the issues in dispute, and the judge's disposition of the issues in dispute by applying the law to the facts.

A judge's decision at trial can be appealed, however the appeal must establish an error of law or a gross misapprehension of the evidence to succeed; you don't get to appeal a decision just because you don't like it. In Shannon, the appellant claimed that the trial judge erred in law by "failing to provide adequate or sufficient reasons" for his valuation of an asset, and that in the absence of more fulsome reasons she could not assess whether the judge had made a mistake in his judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal after a thorough review of the applicable law. These are the highlights of the court's analysis, quoted directly from the decision:
> A trial judge has a duty to give adequate or sufficient reasons for his or her decision. Failure to give adequate or sufficient reasons for judgment is an error of law. (Willick v. Willick, [1994] 3 SCR 670; F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53)

> The function of reasons for judgment is to explain what the trial judge has decided and why he or she reached that decision. (R. v. Morrissey (1995), 22 O.R. (3d) 514 (C.A.); R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51)

> Reasons for judgment should demonstrate "a logical connection between the 'what' – the verdict – and the 'why' – the basis for the verdict," when they are read as a whole in the context of the evidence and the live issues at trial, and the submissions of counsel. (R.E.M.)

> In the civil context, the duty to give reasons is to:
  1. justify and explain the result;
  2. tell the losing party why he or she lost;
  3. provide for informed consideration of the grounds of appeal; and,
  4. satisfy the public that justice has been done.
(R. v. Walker, 2008 SCC 34)

> An appeal court cannot intervene merely because it believes the trial judge did a poor job of expressing herself. Nor is a failure to give adequate reasons a free standing basis for appeal. ... Nor are reasons inadequate because in hindsight, it may be possible to say that the reasons were not as clear and comprehensive as they might have been. (F.H.)

> There is no free-standing right of appeal on the adequacy or sufficiency of a judge's reasons. Moreover, even where the logical connection between the evidence and the decision cannot be discerned ... appellate intervention will not be justified if the record itself permits meaningful appellate review. (R. v. Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17)
In Shannon, evidence about the value of the asset was available from the record of the Supreme Court proceedings in the form of an expert's appraisal and a rebuttal report prepared by another expert. Said the Court of Appeal:

"It is evident the trial judge was faced with a wide range of potential share values, calculated under two different valuation approaches... He understandably recognized his decision as to the value of the shares must be arbitrary to some degree, given the uncertainty associated with the Company's future. In choosing a fair market value of $500,000, it may be inferred that he began his analysis with [X]'s valuation of the shares as it was the only opinion before the court on that issue. However, he also appears to have preferred [Y]'s more optimistic portrayal of the Company's potential. This is evident in his finding that the Company would not be sold and had value as an ongoing concern. On the other hand, it is also apparent that he accepted that the unique features of this business and the uncertainties in the ... market limited its marketability and therefore its value as a going concern. In my view, the valuation of $500,000 takes into account these competing considerations. Thus while the 'why' for the trial judge's valuation of the shares could have been expressed more clearly, in my view it is adequately explained when examined in the context of the evidentiary record.

"The reasons for judgment in this case are to be distinguished from those considered by the Court in Crepnjak v. Crepnjak, 2011 BCCA 177... In Crepnjak, the necessary findings to support the chambers judge's conclusions could not be discerned from his reasons or the evidentiary record and, accordingly, the appeal was allowed and a new hearing ordered."
To boil this all down, the judge at trial has a duty to provide reasons for judgment which allow the parties and the general public to understand her decision and why she reached that particular decision. An appeal based on the insufficiency of reasons for judgment will only succeed where the reasons for a decision cannot be discerned from both the reasons for judgment and the record of the trial proceedings.

Tuesday, 9 July 2013

Marriage and the Material Girl/Boy

The LA Times has reported on a study published in the Journal of Couple & Relationship Therapy, "Materialism and Marriage: Couple Profiles of Congruent and Incongruent Spouses," which found that "couples where both spouses are materialistic were worse off on nearly every measure." Says the Times:
"Statistical analysis of the research showed that couples who say money is not important to them score 10% to 15% better on marriage stability and other measures of relationship quality than couples who are openly materialistic.
"The study also found that couples in which only one partner is materialistic fare better than couples in which both partners are materialistic."
Well, they do say that money can't buy happiness, and that's certainly true during a relationship and after its collapse. I see some unusual things as a divorce lawyer, but it's always a surprise when I run into people who are more troubled by the potential damage to their material wealth than the prospect of losing contact with their children; what's not surprising at all is that people with this sort of attitude would have especially fractious marriages.

Sunday, 7 July 2013

Supreme Court Releases Decision on Vexatious Litigants

The Supreme Court has helpfully summarized the law on vexatious litigants in a new case, Vancouver City Savings Credit Union v. Randhawa.

In a nutshell, this issue has to do with the court's authority to control its own process and the parties before it. It can happen, but doesn't with great frequency, that a person will use the court system to initiate frivolous actions and applications seeking impossible orders without a real foundation in law. Sometimes these are the people whose make claims that the RCMP is attempting to control their thoughts through their toaster, and in the course of their claim against the RCMP also sue the Attorney General, Premier, Prime Minister and Queen for good measure. At other times, these are the people who have a legitimate grievance but lack the judgment to distinguish between the trivial and the substantive. Both sorts of litigant tend to appeal the judgments they don't like and appeal lost appeals, and their litigation gets stuck in an endless cycle of losing applications and losing appeals; these litigants lack the ability to understand that when the court says "enough," the court really means enough.

Section 18 of the Supreme Court Act provides an instructive gloss on the court's inherent jurisdiction to control its own processes and says the following, under the heading Vexatious Proceedings:
"If, on an application by any person, the court is satisfied that a person has habitually, persistently and without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious legal proceedings in the Supreme Court or in the Provincial Court against the same or different persons, the court may, after hearing that person or giving him or her an opportunity to be heard, order that a legal proceeding must not, without leave of the court, be instituted by that person in any court."
In other words, the court can require that a litigant not start an action, or bring an application in an action, without getting permission first.

For people stuck in endless meretricious litigation this can be a boon! Normally, you see, a litigant has the right to sue whomever he or she wishes, and, once the action is commenced, the right to apply for whatever orders strike his or her fancy whenever the moon is in the right phase. Normally, however, people exercise good judgment and are somewhat restrained by cost to bring only those actions and applications which are in fact meritorious.

In the Vancouver City Savings case, the credit union applied for a s. 18 order that the respondents:
"... be prohibited from initiating any legal proceedings, including but not limited to interlocutory applications, against VanCity, or any of its officers, agents or employees without leave of the court."
The judge began his analysis quoting from the 2010 Supreme Court decision in Holland v. Marshall (I've put the key elements in bold):
"[7] To succeed on an application pursuant to s. 18, the applicant must demonstrate:
1. that the proceedings are vexatious in the sense of having been taken in the absence of objectively reasonable ground; and

2. that proceedings have been brought habitually or persistently, such that the litigant has continued obstinately in the course of conduct, despite protests or criticism. (British Columbia) Public Guardian and Trustee v. Brown, 2002 BCSC 1152.
"[8] In Lang Michener v. Fabian ... the Ontario High Court described the characteristics of a typical vexatious proceeding:
(a) bringing one or more actions to decide an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction;

(b) where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief;

(c) actions brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment or oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;

(d) grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings;

(e) failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings;

(f) persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions; and

(g) in determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action."
After a relatively succinct review of the lengthy history of proceedings, the judge said this:

"It is as apparent to me ... that the respondents have persisted in bringing 'a raft of doomed applications'. They have done so in the face of clear judicial pronouncements, directions or advice explaining the lack of jurisdiction of this court to set aside final orders or to revisit issues that have already been decided. ...

"It is apparent to me that in the face of the judicial criticism, advice and direction the respondents will simply continue to bring applications in this proceeding which have no objective or reasonable basis. They are acting habitually and persistently in the face of judicial direction and criticism."
As you might expect from concluding comments like these, the credit union obtained the order sought.

Family Law Act to Be Introduced This Fall

The text of the Lieutenant-Governor's Speech from the Throne has just been published, and, in the context of a discussion about improving access to justice, says this:
"The government will introduce the new Family Law Act during this session, to promote early resolution of family law problems."
There you have it; change is coming! Here's some background reading:

If the new bill looks anything like the white paper, the law of domestic relations in this province is going to undergo a stem to stern overhaul which will place British Columbia at the forefront of law reform in Canada.

Visit the Legislative Assembly's website at www.leg.bc.ca/39th4th/index.htm to track the introduction and progress of the bill through the legislature.

Update: 14 November 2011

Bill 16, the Family Law Act, was introduced in the provincial legislature today. I've summarized the new legislation in a new post, "Family Law Act Introduced!"