Showing posts with label children. Show all posts
Showing posts with label children. Show all posts

Friday, 21 June 2013

Judge Forced to Name Child

The Daily Mail reports that a judge of the Family Court of Australia was put in the unenviable position of having to pick the name of a two year old child whose birth had yet to be registered as a result of her parents' squabble. Apparently, the child's parents split up before the child was born and couldn't agree on what name she should have. The father insisted on calling her by one name - and did - while the mother insisted on calling her by another - and did.

Having been forced to decide the matter, the court acted in the manner of all commonwealth family law courts and resolved the issue through a rigorous application common sense... after the father refused a proposal to simply hyphenate the two names. The court picked the name chosen by the mother as that was the name by which most people knew the child and because the root of the father's opposition to the name lay in his "determination to control the mother and her parenting" rather than some rational objection.

Sunday, 16 June 2013

Justice Education Society Launches Online Parenting After Separation Program

On 21 March 2011 the Justice Education Society, formerly the Law Courts Education Society, launched an online version of the Parenting After Separation program, available through the Families Change website. I've taken a look at the online PAS program and it's a pretty impressive effort. Even more impressively, JES says that they're expecting to have a similar online program available in Punjabi and Cantonese or Mandarin by the end of April.

The PAS program is a mandatory part of the court process in the Abbotsford, Campbell River, Chilliwack, Courtney, Kamloops, Kelowna, Nanaimo, New Westminster, North Vancouver, Penticton, Port Coquitlam, Prince George, Richmond, Surrey, Vancouver, Vernon and Victoria registries of the provincial court. It is intended to teach parents about how children experience separation, how parents can protect children from the conflict, and how parents can make decisions which put their children's interests first. I recommend the program to all parents who are thinking of separating, not just those involved in litigation in the provincial court.

The Attorney General's website has a list of locations (PDF) where the PAS program is offered live, a brochure (PDF) for the program, and the program handbook in English, French, Chinese and Punjabi (PDF).

Update: 25 March 2011

And the news gets better yet. JES is looking for people to evaluate their online Parenting After Separation program. The first fifty people will be paid $50 for completing the online program, including the final exam, and filling out an evaluation form.

This is how it works:
  1. visit www.familieschange.ca starting today,
  2. click on the icon for the online Parenting After Separation program,
  3. click the REGISTER button and provide your name and telephone number,
  4. complete the course and take the final exam,
  5. fill out the online evaluation form after the final exam, and
  6. answer a few follow questions by telephone and provide a mailing address for your cheque.
Please address any questions to Kevin Smith at kevin.smith@justiceeducation.ca.

Saturday, 15 June 2013

Child Abduction Cases and the Courts

I've spent much of the past week at a legal conference in Calgary (not the one featuring the Chief Justice, that was in Toronto). One of the sessions dealt with interprovincial and international child abduction and offered a lot of information I think might be of interest to a broader audience.

International Abduction

The website of the Hague Conference on Private International Law can be found at www.hcch.net. This is where you'll find a complete listing of the international Hague agreements on domestic relations, covering legal issues ranging from adoption to support obligations, as well as the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The Conference's child abduction case law database can be found at www.incadat.com.

Certain signatories to the convention on child abduction have offered up a member of their judiciaries to the International Hague Network of Judges, formed to support the convention by easing communication between the courts of signatory countries. The list of participating judges as of December 2010 can be found here (PDF); the Canadian judges are:
  • Civil Law: L'hon. Juge Chamberland, la Cour d'appel du Québec
  • Common Law: Hon. Madam Justice Diamond, Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench
The Central Authority for the convention in British Columbia is Ms. Penelope Lipsack of the Attorney General's office.

Interprovincial Abduction

The primary federal legislation on custody and access rights is the Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.). Although the Divorce Act contains no enforcement provisions, s. 20 provides that Divorce Act orders have effect throughout Canada and may be registered in the court of any province and be enforced as an order of that court. Another federal law, the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Act, RSC 1985, c. 4 (2nd Supp.) provides for the release of government information about a person for the purposes of enforcing orders about custody and access.

The current provincial and territorial legislation on the enforcement of custody and access rights is:
(Interestingly, the Nova Scotia enforcement legislation only applies in respect of those provinces which have reciprocal agreements with Nova Scotia, and not all do.)

The Judicial Response

The Canadian Judicial Council has established a network of superior court contact judges to address interprovincial and international abduction cases and facilitate communication between the courts of different provinces and between Canadian courts and foreign courts. The current members of the Canadian Network of Contact Judges for Interjurisdictional Cases of Child Protection are:
  • Chair: Hon. Madam Justice Diamond, Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench
  • Alberta: Hon. Madam Justice Moen, Court of Queen's Bench
  • British Columbia: Hon. Mr. Justice Butler, Supreme Court
  • Manitoba: Hon. Madam Justice MacPhail, Court of Queen's Bench
  • New Brunswick: L'hon. Juge Robichaud, la Cour du Banc de la Reine
  • Newfoundland & Labrador: Hon. Mr. Justice Cook, Supreme Court Trial Division
  • Northwest Territories: Hon. Madam Justice Schuler, Supreme Court
  • Nova Scotia: Hon. Mr. Justice Dellapinna, Supreme Court Family Division
  • Nunavut: Hon. Mr. Justice Johnson, Court of Justice
  • Ontario: Hon. Mr. Justice Harper, Superior Court of Justice
  • PEI: Chief Justice Matheson, Supreme Court
  • Quebec: L'hon. Juge Gaudreau, la Cour supérieure
  • Saskatchewan: Hon. Madam Justice Ryan-Froslie, Court of Queen's Bench
  • Yukon: Hon. Mr. Justice Gower, Supreme Court
A similar network has been established between the provincial courts. The current contact judges are:
  • Alberta: Hon. Judge O'Gorman, Provincial Court
  • British Columbia: Hon. Judge Wingham, Provincial Court
  • Manitoba: Associate Chief Judge Thompson, Provincial Court
  • Newfoundland & Labrador: Hon. Judge Howe, Provincial Family Court
  • Northwest Territories: Hon. Judge Gorin, Territorial Court
  • Nova Scotia: Chief Judge Comeau, Provincial Family Court
  • Ontario, Toronto: Hon. Justices Weagant and Scully, Ontario Court of Justice
  • Ontario, Central West: Hon. Justice Maresca, Ontario Court of Justice (Brampton)
  • Ontario, West: Hon. Justice Glenn, Ontario Court of Justice (Chatham)
  • Ontario, East: Hon. Justice Malcolm, Ontario Court of Justice (Belleville)
  • Ontario, Northwest: Hon. Justice McKay, Ontario Court of Justice (Fort Frances)
  • Ontario, Northeast: Hon. Justice Kukurin, Ontario Court of Justice (Sault Ste. Marie)
  • Quebec: Juge en chef adjointe Gaumond, la Cour du Québec

Friday, 14 June 2013

Parenting Coordinators Update Roster List

The BC Parenting Coordinators Roster Society has expanded its roster. The society now boasts a total of 34 accredited parenting coordinators and improved availability across the province, with members practicing in:
  • Cranbrook
  • Fort St. John
  • Kelowna
  • Nanaimo
  • North Vancouver
  • Port Coquitlam
  • Richmond
  • Surrey
  • Vancouver
  • Victoria
In August this year, the society announced its adoption of the Guidelines for Parenting Coordination (PDF) of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts as the practice standards of its members and published its criteria for admission to the society as a parenting coordinator.

Saturday, 8 June 2013

Custody and Guardianship

Important Update: The Family Law Act was introduced on 14 November 2011 and contains a number of provisions which are critical to the comments made in this post. See my post "Family Law Act Introduced!" for more information.

At
one spot in my website, I say this:
"Because of certain complicated legal principles involving things like the doctrine of paramountcy, the following combinations of custody and guardianship are available:
  1. joint custody and joint guardianship;
  2. sole custody and joint guardianship; and,
  3. sole custody and sole guardianship.
It is not possible for the parties to have joint custody while one parent is the child's sole guardian."
My off-hand reference to "complicated legal principles" has proven unsatisfactory to many, including a lot of lawyers. Let me explain.

Custody

At one point, in 1857 to be exact, the law only talked about the children of separated parents in terms of custody and access. The first law on divorce, the English Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, disposed of the care and control of children in one short paragraph about custody and access... unlike today's Divorce Act and Family Relations Act, which seem to spend pages on the subject.

The Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act was just one of the English laws that were brought into the Colony of British Columbia in 1858 by the proclamation of Governor Sir James Douglas. Since British Columbia didn't join Canada until after Confederation in 1867, British Columbia managed to keep its own Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act on the books for another hundred years, despite the division of powers in ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act which assigns the power to legislate on divorce exclusively to the federal government.

Canada received the English law as well of course, and it remains on the books today, although much amended, as the Divorce Act. The Divorce Act still only talks about custody and access.

Guardianship

British Columbia first passed a law on guardianship in the late 1880s, in the Apprentices and Minors Act. That law dealt with the obligations masters had to provide the necessities of life to the apprentices in their charge. Essentially, it talked about the parent-like rights and obligations masters had in respect of the minor children who were their apprentices.

(To be clear, guardianship had been known to the common law for hundreds of years. This was the first piece of legislation on the subject.)

If the clock was stopped here, things would've been fairly clear. Custody would mean the parental rights and obligations exercised by parents and guardianship would mean the parent-like
rights and obligations exercised by people who aren't parents.
Guardianship crept into the family law arena however when the provisions of the Apprentices and Minors Act were moved into the Infants Act, which mostly had to do with children's ability to enter into binding contracts, and later into the Equal Guardianship of Infants Act. (The "equal" in the title of this last act meant that women could apply for guardianship as well as men.)

The Family Relations Act

Things got a bit confused in British Columbia when the provincial government passed the Family Relations Act in 1972. The new act bundled together a bunch of provincial legislation on different family law issues in one convenient package, repealing the provincial Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act along the way, and stuck the rules about custody right beside
the rules about guardianship. The problem, from a lawyer's perspective at least, is that the new law didn't distinguish between custody and guardianship, much less explain them, and said that "any person," not just parents, could apply for custody and guardianship.

In order to accommodate the Divorce Act, however, s. 27(4) of the Family Relations Act provides that a Divorce Act order for custody is deemed to include an order for guardianship.

The Doctrine of Paramountcy

This is a constitutional principle which says that where the federal government and a provincial government have both passed a law on the same subject, the federal government's law takes priority and the provincial law is invalid to the extent that it is inconsistent with the federal law. This comes into our discussion because both the federal government and the provincial government have passed laws about custody, although only the province has a law about guardianship.

Summary and Conclusion

The meaning of "custody" under the Divorce Act contains everything that has to do with the care and control of children following separation. This must be the case because the Divorce Act only talks about custody, and "custody" must therefore be exhaustive of parents' rights and obligations in respect of their children following separation. A Divorce Act order for custody must include whatever a Family Relations Act order about guardianship means; to put it another way, guardianship and custody under the Family Relations Act can't together mean anything more than what is meant by custody under the Divorce Act.

The provincial government might decide to divide parental rights and obligations into custody and guardianship if it wishes, but however the province chooses to divide these rights and obligations, an order for custody under the federal Divorce Act says it all... and it says it all ultimately because of the doctrine of paramountcy. The Divorce Act wins. Whatever guardianship might mean, it must be included within the Divorce Act's idea of custody.

As a result of all this, you can't have an order for joint custody along with an order that gives sole guardianship to one of those parents; joint custody must include joint guardianship, and even if it didn't, assigning sole guardianship to one parent would violate the paramountcy doctrine by allowing a provincial law, the law that talks about guardianship, to step over a federal law, the law that only talks about custody. (Things might be better if the orders were made only under the Family Relations Act since the paramountcy doctrine wouldn't be invoked, but you'd still run into the problem of guardianship's subordination within the larger concept of custody.)

I hope this clears things up a bit.

Tuesday, 4 June 2013

Custody and Guardianship

Important Update: The Family Law Act was introduced on 14 November 2011 and contains a number of provisions which are critical to the comments made in this post. See my post "Family Law Act Introduced!" for more information.

At
one spot in my website, I say this:
"Because of certain complicated legal principles involving things like the doctrine of paramountcy, the following combinations of custody and guardianship are available:
  1. joint custody and joint guardianship;
  2. sole custody and joint guardianship; and,
  3. sole custody and sole guardianship.
It is not possible for the parties to have joint custody while one parent is the child's sole guardian."
My off-hand reference to "complicated legal principles" has proven unsatisfactory to many, including a lot of lawyers. Let me explain.

Custody

At one point, in 1857 to be exact, the law only talked about the children of separated parents in terms of custody and access. The first law on divorce, the English Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, disposed of the care and control of children in one short paragraph about custody and access... unlike today's Divorce Act and Family Relations Act, which seem to spend pages on the subject.

The Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act was just one of the English laws that were brought into the Colony of British Columbia in 1858 by the proclamation of Governor Sir James Douglas. Since British Columbia didn't join Canada until after Confederation in 1867, British Columbia managed to keep its own Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act on the books for another hundred years, despite the division of powers in ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act which assigns the power to legislate on divorce exclusively to the federal government.

Canada received the English law as well of course, and it remains on the books today, although much amended, as the Divorce Act. The Divorce Act still only talks about custody and access.

Guardianship

British Columbia first passed a law on guardianship in the late 1880s, in the Apprentices and Minors Act. That law dealt with the obligations masters had to provide the necessities of life to the apprentices in their charge. Essentially, it talked about the parent-like rights and obligations masters had in respect of the minor children who were their apprentices.

(To be clear, guardianship had been known to the common law for hundreds of years. This was the first piece of legislation on the subject.)

If the clock was stopped here, things would've been fairly clear. Custody would mean the parental rights and obligations exercised by parents and guardianship would mean the parent-like
rights and obligations exercised by people who aren't parents.

Guardianship crept into the family law arena however when the provisions of the Apprentices and Minors Act were moved into the Infants Act, which mostly had to do with children's ability to enter into binding contracts, and later into the Equal Guardianship of Infants Act. (The "equal" in the title of this last act meant that women could apply for guardianship as well as men.)

The Family Relations Act

Things got a bit confused in British Columbia when the provincial government passed the Family Relations Act in 1972. The new act bundled together a bunch of provincial legislation on different family law issues in one convenient package, repealing the provincial Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act along the way, and stuck the rules about custody right beside
the rules about guardianship. The problem, from a lawyer's perspective at least, is that the new law didn't distinguish between custody and guardianship, much less explain them, and said that "any person," not just parents, could apply for custody and guardianship.

In order to accommodate the Divorce Act, however, s. 27(4) of the Family Relations Act provides that a Divorce Act order for custody is deemed to include an order for guardianship.

The Doctrine of Paramountcy

This is a constitutional principle which says that where the federal government and a provincial government have both passed a law on the same subject, the federal government's law takes priority and the provincial law is invalid to the extent that it is inconsistent with the federal law. This comes into our discussion because both the federal government and the provincial government have passed laws about custody, although only the province has a law about guardianship.

Summary and Conclusion

The meaning of "custody" under the Divorce Act contains everything that has to do with the care and control of children following separation. This must be the case because the Divorce Act only talks about custody, and "custody" must therefore be exhaustive of parents' rights and obligations in respect of their children following separation. A Divorce Act order for custody must include whatever a Family Relations Act order about guardianship means; to put it another way, guardianship and custody under the Family Relations Act can't together mean anything more than what is meant by custody under the Divorce Act.

The provincial government might decide to divide parental rights and obligations into custody and guardianship if it wishes, but however the province chooses to divide these rights and obligations, an order for custody under the federal Divorce Act says it all... and it says it all ultimately because of the doctrine of paramountcy. The Divorce Act wins. Whatever guardianship might mean, it must be included within the Divorce Act's idea of custody.

As a result of all this, you can't have an order for joint custody along with an order that gives sole guardianship to one of those parents; joint custody must include joint guardianship, and even if it didn't, assigning sole guardianship to one parent would violate the paramountcy doctrine by allowing a provincial law, the law that talks about guardianship, to step over a federal law, the law that only talks about custody. (Things might be better if the orders were made only under the Family Relations Act since the paramountcy doctrine wouldn't be invoked, but you'd still run into the problem of guardianship's subordination within the larger concept of custody.)

I hope this clears things up a bit.

Saturday, 1 June 2013

Parenting Coordinators Group Expands Roster

The BC Parenting Coordinators Roster Society has updated its website, and, along with it, posted an expanded roster of parenting coordinators, bringing the total number of members to 29.

The Society, first established as an unincorporated association in 2007, has finally been incorporated as a non-profit society under the provincial Society Act. The directors of the Society will shortly be establishing a variety of committees to promote parenting coordination in British Columbia, and will be hosting the Society's first Annual General Meeting in the late fall of 2010 or early spring of 2011.

Thursday, 30 May 2013

What Custody and Guardianship Really Mean

Important Update: The Family Law Act was introduced on 14 November 2011 and contains a number of provisions which are critical to the comments made in this post. See my post "Family Law Act Introduced!" for more information.

It's difficult to tell the difference between the rights and duties custody involves from the rights and duties associated with guardianship. This confusion is aggravated because the Divorce Act only talks about custody, but the Family Relations Act talks about both custody and guardianship, and because we get a lot of misleading information about these issues from American media. The explanation, however, involves a history lesson.

The first law on divorce was the UK Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, passed in 1857, which became part of the laws of British Columbia as a result of the proclamation of governor Sir James Douglas on 19 November 1858. The Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act disposed of the whole issue about children in one sentence, which gave the court the authority to make an order about custody at the time it was making an order about divorce, if it thought the custody order was appropriate.

So far, we're still talking about a concept everyone will understand. Custody, within the meaning of the first Divorce Act, describes the right of a parent to direct his or her child's life and make decisions about education, health care, moral instruction, sports activities and so forth, as well as the duty of a parent to provide his or her child with the necessities of life and an education.

Guardianship was first discussed in legislation in British Columbia's Apprentices and Minors Act, passed at some point in the late 1880s. This law discussed the duty of masters to provide the apprenticed children in their care with the necessities of life and an education, and the right of masters to benefit from the child's labour and make decisions about the child's education, health care and so on. Later on, these basic provisions about guardianship were moved into the Infants Act and, by 1930, into the Equal Guardianship of Infants Act.

Guardianship under these laws concerns the rights and duties people have in respect of the children who are in their care. These rights and duties are exactly the rights and duties that parents have, the difference is that these rights and duties are being exercised by someone who isn't a parent. In other words, guardianship is about the parental rights and duties exercised by non-parents.

So far, this still makes a lot of sense, especially when you think about the sort of people who might be guardians today: the person you might ask to care for your children in the event of your death, or the people with whom children are placed when they have been seized from their parents by the government.

Problems started cropping up in 1978 when the provincial government decided to dump all of the laws about separated families into a single piece of legislation, the Family Relations Act. In this new law, custody and guardianship were discussed side by side, and the law now said that "any person" - not just parents - could apply for custody, and that "any person" - not just non-parents - could apply for guardianship. Since parents could now apply for both custody and guardianship parents did apply for both custody and guardianship, and it became difficult to differentiate between the rights and duties included in "custody" and the rights and duties included in "guardianship."

The best that could be said was that "guardianship" now contained the nuts and bolts of parenting: the right to say where the child went to school, the right to direct the course of the child's medical treatment, the right to say where the child would live, the right to say what the child would wear to school and the right to get information from the child's doctors, teachers and coaches. "Custody" suggested a bundle of rights sort of like ownership, in the sense of having the home where the child lived most often.

Things got even worse as time went on, however, because the courts began to award joint custody without requiring parents to share their children's time equally or even near-equally. I, for example, represent parents who live all over the world but have joint custody of children who live here in British Columbia. None of these parents see their children more frequently than once or twice per month, and most see their children only once or twice per year, yet they all have joint custody of their children.

As a result of this evolution in the law, there is no connection at all between the amount of time a parent has with a child and the likelihood of that parent having joint custody or sole custody of the child, or no custodial rights at all. "Joint custody" now really only means that a parent is at least an okay sort of parent, and that he or she gets along relatively well with the other parent. That's about it.

Since so much significance was now lost in the distinction between sole custody and joint custody, the courts began to award joint custody in almost all cases where both parents were good enough parents and got along well enough with each other. At the same time, the courts began to award joint guardianship more and more commonly, and joint guardianship would be awarded with even less reluctance than joint custody... as long as both parents were involved in the child's life and were capable of maintaining the bare amount of communications necessary to discuss things from time to time.

To summarize, sole custody versus joint custody doesn't mean very much any more. In fact, custody doesn't mean much at all compared to guardianship; guardianship is what's most important because guardianship is all about the practical parenting and raising of a child. As well, sole custody doesn't give a parent any more authority than the other parent, as long as the parents have joint guardianship, and joint guardianship is now the rule rather than the exception.

For a longer and more detailed discussion, go to www.bcfamilylawresource.com.

New Website for Children

The BC Justice Education Society, formerly the Law Courts Education Society of BC, has launched a new website, www.kidsbc.ca, aimed at children whose parents are splitting up. The website offers lots of information about separation and the legal process, as well as information about children's experience of and feelings during separation, how separation may impact on their home life, and how their parents might react to separation. I am very impressed with this website.

The new website should nicely complement the provincial government's existing efforts in the area, available at www.familieschange.ca.

Section 15 Reports

"Custody and access reports," "custody assessments" and "section fifteen reports" are some of the names given to reports prepared pursuant to s. 15 of the Family Relations Act. The purpose and scope of these reports can be a bit confusing, because they seem to be treated differently in the Provincial Court and the Supreme Court, because different sorts of people prepare them, and because the scope of s. 15 is really quite broad.

The Family Relations Act

Section 15 says, in part, this:
In a proceeding under this Act, the court may, on application, including an application made without notice to any other person, direct an investigation into a family matter by a person who

(a) has had no previous connection with the parties to the proceeding or to whom each party consents, and

(b) is a family counsellor, social worker or other person approved by the court for the purpose.

(2) A person directed to carry out an investigation under subsection (1) must report the results of the investigation in the manner that the court directs.

I've highlighted the bits that are particularly important for this discussion. Essentially, s. 15 says that the court can order that a report on any family issue be prepared by any person, in whatever manner the court directs, and the court can make an order that a report be prepared on its own initiative or on the application of a party.

Most of the time, people want a s. 15 report for the assessor's recommendations about things like where the children should live most of the time and the optimum parenting schedule. It can happen, however, that people want the assessor to look at a specific problem such as a parent's drinking, mental instability, drug use or personality disorder, and comment on how the issue affects the person's capacity to parent.

Provincial Court

Most of the time, s. 15 reports prepared in matters before the Provincial Court are prepared by family justice counsellors, employees of the Provincial Court who have some training in conducting custody and access assessments, and usually have a background in social work or psychology.

These reports are free but they can take a terribly long time to complete, anywhere from six months to one year or more, depending on which courthouse the parties are at. (Surrey and Vancouver are notoriously overburdened courts.) A private psychologist or psychiatrist could probably get the assessment done faster, but they charge for their work and I'd expect that the cost would start at about $3,000 and go up to $9,000 or more, depending on the circumstances and the scope of the report.

The court can order that a s. 15 report be prepared at the first appearance, at any other appearance before trial and at a family case conference. The court generally won't order s. 15 reports at trial... by then it's too late, and ordering the report would only serve to delay the trial.

Supreme Court

Section 15 reports prepared for the Supreme Court are usually done by private psychologists and psychiatrists. Although they come at a pretty significant cost, they can usually be prepared within three to six months, depending on the issues.

The court can order that a s. 15 report be prepared at a judicial case conference or at any application brought before trial. The court will not order the preparation of a s. 15 report at or on the brink of trial.

Rules of Evidence

In the Supreme Court, s. 15 reports stand as expert evidence. "Expert evidence" is different than other kinds of evidence, because it offers an expert opinion about the best parenting arrangements for the children.

(Normally, the only kind of evidence allowed at trial is evidence of facts: "I saw Ted outside the bank," "I have a blue Chevy Pinto," "last year we went to Chilliwack for Christmas," and so on. Opinion evidence is usually about beliefs, assumptions and conjectures: "aliens live on Jupiter," "my cat is better than your cat," or "Jerry is a bad father." Expert opinion evidence is about an expert's professional conclusions about an issue or question beyond most people's knowledge: "foundations need to be drilled to a minimum depth of 6m in Prince George to avoid frost heaves," "gerbils have an average I.Q. of 15" or "the kinematic viscosity of single non-winter grade oils is measured at a temperature of 100 °C in units of mm²/s.")

As expert evidence, s. 15 reports are often subject to the special provisions of Rule 40A about who is an expert and who isn't, introducing expert reports at trial and cross-examining the person preparing the report. The Supreme Court is usually very strict about how evidence is admitted at trial and how expert reports can be used.

Things are a bit different in the Provincial Court. Rule 11(2) deals with s. 15 reports, and this rule doesn't describe persons preparing s. 15 reports as "experts." In fact, the rule seems to treat s. 15 reports entirely differently than expert evidence, which is dealt with in Rule 11(3) to (8). This is probably why family justice counsellors are able to prepare s. 15 reports for Provincial Court: they are not expected to qualify as experts and s. 15 reports are treated differently than the usual sort of expert evidence.

Views of the Child Reports

Views of the child reports are a kind of s. 15 report in which the assessor is hired to meet with the child and report back to the court or the parents on the child's views and wishes. These reports can be prepared by experts (psychologists or psychiatrists) or by non-experts (lawyers, court workers and so forth). They do not recommend or suggest a certain parenting arrangement; they are primarily geared toward finding out what the child's preferences are, even though there's no guarantee that the court will do what the child wants.

Although it probably seems that these reports don't have a great deal of utility, in fact they are very helpful when a dispute is primarily focused on parenting issues, especially in the context of settlement discussions at case conferences. Parents can be profoundly influenced toward reason by a third-party's report of their children's wishes.

When these reports are prepared by experts, the expert will sometimes administer some tests to determine the child's truthfulness and honesty, and the expert may look at difficult issues such as whether the child has been alienated from a parent or whether the child has been coached to have a certain preference.

Non-experts don't have the special skills to administer tests like that or to give opinions about whether a child has been influenced by a parent or alienated against a parent. As a consequence, while their reports are much more limited in scope and usefulness, they are generally much cheaper and faster to obtain than expert's views of the child reports: you're not paying for an expert and the assessor isn't going into an expert's level of detail.

There is another difference between expert's and non-expert's views of the child reports that has to do with the previous discussion about evidence. Expert's views of the child reports are expert evidence that can be used in both the Provincial Court and the Supreme Court. Although non-expert's views of the child reports can be used in the Provincial Court because of the special provisions of Rule 11(2), non-experts won't meet Rule 40A's test for admissibility and can't be used as evidence in the Supreme Court.

Summary

Section 15 is really quite broad. It can be used to make an application for almost any kind of report in a family law case... (I was about to say "except for medical reports and financial reports," but nothing in s. 15 really limits the sort of report the court can order to just issues about children, does it?) ...but is most often used to get an assessment of the parenting arrangements that would be best for the children.

Custody and access reports can take a lot of time to process in the Provincial Court but they are usually free. Custody and access reports can be had much more quickly in the Supreme Court, but since they're done by private psychiatrists and psychologists they can be very expensive.

Views of the child reports are an underused species of s. 15 report, and are usually must faster and cheaper to obtain than custody and access reports, particularly where the report is prepared by a non-expert. They do not have the same persuasive effect on the court that custody and access reports have, however, and non-expert views of the child reports may not be admissible in Supreme Court matters.

Sunday, 16 September 2012

Supreme Court Releases Decision on the Naming of Children

On Friday, the Supreme Court released its decision in Landa-McAuliffe v. Boland which addresses, among other things, the factors the court should take into account when being asked to name a child. The factual background behind this aspect of the case is neatly summarized by the court itself:
[14] Briefly, Ms. Boland changed [the child's] name from “____ ____ ____ Landa” to “____ ____ ____ Boland Landa” in order to include her own surname. She appears to have sought this change under s. 4 of the Name Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 328. That section normally requires consent, although there is provision to waive consent under section 4(6) due to exceptional circumstances. 
[15] Mr. Landa wants a hyphenated surname “Landa-Boland” with his name first. Ms. Boland wants the surname “Boland-Landa” with her name first. Ms. Boland is the primary caregiver of the child.
Yes, people really do go to court with problems like this.

In analyzing the father's request, the court firstly concludes that it has parens patriae jurisdiction to make decisions about the naming of children. Parens patriae means "parent of the country" and refers to the supreme court's inherent jurisdiction to make decisions respecting people under a legal disability, although the phrase is most commonly used in reference to children.

Next, the court references the considerations set out in a 1985 case from Alberta, Wintemute v. O’Sullivan, to be taken into account when the court is asked to make decisions about naming children:
  1. the welfare of the child;
  2. the short and long term effects of a change in the child’s surname;
  3. any embarrassment the child might suffer if the surname is different from that of the custodial parent;
  4. the potential for confusion of identity;
  5. the effect of change of name on the child; and,
  6. the effect of frequent or random changes of name.
The court then cites a 2010 decision from New Brunswick, L.M.D. v. J.R.S., which addressed the issue of hyphenated surnames:
[35] ... including the name of both parents is consistent with a child’s best interests. This is not a random change of name. Nor is it a request without a purpose. In the absence of any evidence to suggest that [the child's] existing surname – the name of only one parent – is in his best interest or otherwise preferable in the circumstances, a surname that includes the names of both parents cannot be rejected simply on the basis that the status quo should prevail. Not only is there no reason why the name should not change but also, in the circumstances of [the child], given his young age (he was still three when the initial application was filed) and close relationship with both parents, he will benefit from a name that reflects his connection to two separate families.
Finally, the court takes some guidance from s. 4.1 of the Vital Statistics Act, the provincial law that deals with, among other things, the registration and naming of newborn children. Section 4.1 deals with declarations of parentage, and subsection (2) provides that when the court is also making an order about the child's name, the court must choose either:
  1. the surname of either parent; or,
  2. a surname consisting of both parents' surnames hyphenated or combined in alphabetical order.
The court then, quite sensibly, concludes that the child should have the hyphenated surname Boland-Landa, for these reasons:
[19] I do not consider there to be any factors, singly or collectively, preponderantly favouring that either parents name go first in the present case. ... 
[21] ... the parties seem to be in agreement, a hyphenated last name would promote the child and his collaterals indentifying with both parents. 
[22] In choosing the order of the last names here as “Boland-Landa” on the basis of alphabetization, the decision would be consistent with provincial legislation and does not favour either parent. It is a neutral choice. 
[23] The name also has the advantage of being least disruptive to the child, as it is essentially the same name that the child has borne for the past several years. In my opinion the order of the last names alphabetically hyphenated promotes [the child's] best interests.
For those of you who are curious, the general rules for the naming of children by parents are set out at s. 4 of the Vital Statistics Act:
  1. if only one parent registers the birth, the child's surname is the name chosen by that parent, which could be any name;
  2. if two parents register the birth, the surname is whatever name they agree on;
  3. if the parents cannot agree on the name, the surname must be either the parents' surname if they have the same surname, or, if they have different surnames, the parents' surnames either combined or hyphenated in alphabetical order; and,
  4. a hyphenated surname must not consist of more than two names, even if one of the parents has a hyphenated surname.
The chief executive office of the Vital Statistics Agency retains discretion about the registration of names under s. 9 of the act, and may refuse to register a name if the name that a parent wishes to give to a child:
  1. might cause mistake or confusion,
  2. might cause embarrassment to the child;
  3. is sought for an improper purpose; or,
  4. "is, on any other ground, objectionable."
That last factor is pretty broad. I'm not sure that Harper Seven, Blue Ivy Carter, Zuma Nesta Rock, Dweezil or Moon Unit would have made it through in British Columbia.

Saturday, 28 July 2012

Paying the Fees of Child Advocates

A "child advocate" is a lawyer hired to represent the interests of a child in a family law dispute between the child's parents. (Once upon a time, the court could have appointed a "family advocate" under s. 2 of the Family Relations Act, however the provincial government defunded this program years ago.) I have been retained as a child advocate and it is a challenging but very rewarding role.

My friend Agnes Huang has pointed me to a very interesting case from the Supreme Court in 2010, C.L.M. v. D.J.M., on the issues of whether and how the cost of a child advocate should be paid by the parties.

In this unsual case, a master had given permission for the child advocate to appear on behalf of the child prior to the court hearing. The lawyer was paid by the wife. The wife was successful at the hearing and received an order that she have her costs of the application. The wife then, and this is the important part, said that the husband should have to pay for the cost of the child advocate as part of her costs.

The court said this about the child advocate:
[9] I find that the appointment of a child advocate was necessary in this case. In Dormer v. Thomas, Martinson J. noted that in family cases with complex and contentious circumstances, one of the ways the court can carry out its legal obligation to determine the best interests of the children is to have representation for the children. The appointment of a child advocate is one of the ways this can be accomplished. 
[10] Here, the situation was complex and contentious. There were claims of inappropriate sexual touching of children other than the children of the marriage, which D.J.M. denied. There were also allegations of alienation which C.L.M. denied. A report had been prepared regarding the views of the children, but it did not comment on the maturity of the children or the question of whether the children were influenced by their mother. In addition, there was no opinion evidence before the court in the form of a Family Relations Act s. 15 report commenting on the best interests of the children. In these difficult circumstances, there was a tremendous benefit to the court in having [the child advocate] present the children’s position. I found [the advocate's] submissions to be carefully considered and extremely helpful.
Having established that the child advocate served a useful role and that his retainer was not an unnecessary frivolity, the court then considered whether the expense was an expense that should be recovered by the person awarded costs as a normal disbursement, like the expense of an expert, incurred to advance the case. The court set out seven considerations that should be taken into account in this analysis:
  1. previous court approval: whether the presence of the child advocate received prior court approval;
  2. neutrality of appointment or funding: whether the child advocate was chosen and/or funded by one of the parties;
  3. consent: whether both parties consented to the appointment of the child advocate;
  4. impartiality of content: whether, as between the parties, the child advocate was neutral, impartial and objective;
  5. helpfulness of content: whether the child advocate presented evidence or argument before the court that would not otherwise have been available;
  6. ability to pay: if one party has a substantially lower ability to pay, fairness may require that the cost be shared proportionally, or that the party with greater ability to pay incur the expense; and,
  7. success: was one party substantially successful?
Considering these factors, the court held that the wife should be entitled to recover half of her expenses for the child advocate:
[16] Balancing these factors in this case, I have determined that C.L.M. is entitled to recover, as a disbursement from D.J.M., one-half of Mr. W.’s fee as advocate for the children. While C.L.M. was successful, the question of access was not finally resolved by the application. The other factors set out above are of some significance in this case. D.J.M. never consented to Mr. W.’s appointment. At the time of hearing of the application, he did not anticipate that at the end of the day he might be asked to pay Mr. W.’s fees. The application before Master Taylor did not settle that issue in a definitive way. Mr. W. carried out his duties in an impartial and appropriate way. His contribution to the proceeding was of assistance to both parties. In this case, both parties do have some ability to pay. In these circumstances, I am of the view that it is appropriate for the parties to share the expense equally.
[This is, I am surprised to see, my two hundredth post. My thanks to the law nerds and others following my blog for their continuing attention and for making this blog as popular as it has become.]