Supreme Court Releases Decision on Agents Appearing in Court

The British Columbia Supreme Court has just released a decision, in the case of Ambrosi v. Duckworth, on the right of parties to have people other than lawyers appear in court on their behalf.

The problem arises from s. 15(1) of the Legal Profession Act which says that "no person, other than a practising lawyer, is permitted to engage in the practice of law;" s. 85 of the act makes it an offence, punishable under the Offence Act, to contravene s. 15. The Legal Profession Act offers a few exceptions to this general prohibition:

• a party to an action may represent him- or herself;
• any person who is entitled to vote in British Columbia may represent someone if the narrow criteria of the Court Agent Act apply (if there are fewer than two practising lawyers in town or if there are fewer than two lawyers with offices within 8km of the courthouse);
• a non-lawyer employed by the Legal Services Society may represent someone within the limits of s. 12 of the Legal Services Society Act; and,
• an articled student may represent someone to the extent permitted by the Law Society.

However, regardless of the Legal Profession Act, the court has the inherent right to control its own process and may, on a case by case basis, allow a non-lawyer to represent someone. That was the issue in Ambrosi when the applicant asked the court for leave for someone to speak on his behalf and present his application.

The judge began his analysis by looking at a 2002 case from the Court of Appeal, R. v. Dick (I've put the important bits in bold):

"[6] The Crown raised a preliminary objection ... and brought to our attention several reasons why [the proposed agent] should not be accorded the privilege of audience. We use the word 'privilege' advisedly, there being clear authority for the proposition that, subject to statutory provisions otherwise, it lies within a court's discretion to permit or not to permit a person who is not a lawyer, to represent a litigant in court. In particular we note the judgment of Lord Denning in Engineers' and Managers' Association v. Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service et al. ... where it was said that the discretionary power to grant a privilege of audience to other persons should be exercised 'rarely and with caution' ...

"[7] There are strong public policy reasons for this general rule. Each court has the responsibility to ensure that persons appearing before it are properly represented and (in the case of criminal law) defended, and to maintain the rule of law and the integrity of the court generally. As was said by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Romanowicz ... :

'The power to refuse audience to an agent must be invoked whenever it is necessary to do so to protect the proper administration of justice. The proper administration of justice requires that the accused's constitutional rights, particularly the right to a fair trial, be protected. It also requires the fair treatment of other participants in the process (eg. witnesses) and that the proceedings be conducted in a manner that will command the respect of the community.

'It is impossible to catalogue all of the circumstances in which representation by a particular agent would imperil the administration of justice and properly call for an order disqualifying that agent. Obviously, representation by agents lacking the ability to competently represent an accused endangers all aspects of the proper administration of justice, particularly the accused's right to a fair trial. Other examples where the administration of justice would suffer irreparable harm if an agent were allowed to appear are found in the material filed on this appeal. ... [There may be] situations in which the agent's criminal record or other discreditable acts are such as to permit the conclusion that the agent cannot be relied on to conduct a trial ethically and honourably.'"

To summarize this somewhat:

1. The court has the discretion to allow an agent to represent a litigant.
2. This discretion should be exercised with restraint, and should be exercised in bearing in mind the need to ensure that the litigant is well-represented, the rule of law is maintained and the integrity of the court is preserved.
3. The court should refuse to allow an agent to act when necessary to protect the proper administration of justice. This might be the case where an agent is incompetent or is unlikely to conduct him- or herself in an ethical manner.

Although the applicant presented a number of good reasons why the agent should be allowed to represent him, including the prejudice to his right to a fair hearing, his constitutional right to freedom of expression, his entitlement to appear by an agent of his own choice, and his right to have access to justice, the respondent presented a lengthy body of court decisions reflecting poorly on the proposed agent's past conduct in court. Ultimately, the judge held that:

"[55] I have not been convinced that I should exercise my discretion to allow [the proposed agent] to appear as agent for Mr. Ambrosi. I am satisfied that it would not be in the interest of justice to allow [the proposed agent] to appear as agent. ... I am satisfied that Mr. Ambrosi can afford a lawyer if he wishes, or may even be able to find someone more appropriate to appear as his agent. ..."

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Supreme Court Releases Decision on Vexatious Litigants

The Supreme Court has helpfully summarized the law on vexatious litigants in a new case, Vancouver City Savings Credit Union v. Randhawa.

In a nutshell, this issue has to do with the court's authority to control its own process and the parties before it. It can happen, but doesn't with great frequency, that a person will use the court system to initiate frivolous actions and applications seeking impossible orders without a real foundation in law. Sometimes these are the people whose make claims that the RCMP is attempting to control their thoughts through their toaster, and in the course of their claim against the RCMP also sue the Attorney General, Premier, Prime Minister and Queen for good measure. At other times, these are the people who have a legitimate grievance but lack the judgment to distinguish between the trivial and the substantive. Both sorts of litigant tend to appeal the judgments they don't like and appeal lost appeals, and their litigation gets stuck in an endless cycle of losing applications and losing appeals; these litigants lack the ability to understand that when the court says "enough," the court really means enough.

Section 18 of the Supreme Court Act provides an instructive gloss on the court's inherent jurisdiction to control its own processes and says the following, under the heading Vexatious Proceedings:

"If, on an application by any person, the court is satisfied that a person has habitually, persistently and without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious legal proceedings in the Supreme Court or in the Provincial Court against the same or different persons, the court may, after hearing that person or giving him or her an opportunity to be heard, order that a legal proceeding must not, without leave of the court, be instituted by that person in any court."

In other words, the court can require that a litigant not start an action, or bring an application in an action, without getting permission first.

For people stuck in endless meretricious litigation this can be a boon! Normally, you see, a litigant has the right to sue whomever he or she wishes, and, once the action is commenced, the right to apply for whatever orders strike his or her fancy whenever the moon is in the right phase. Normally, however, people exercise good judgment and are somewhat restrained by cost to bring only those actions and applications which are in fact meritorious.

In the Vancouver City Savings case, the credit union applied for a s. 18 order that the respondents:

"... be prohibited from initiating any legal proceedings, including but not limited to interlocutory applications, against VanCity, or any of its officers, agents or employees without leave of the court."

The judge began his analysis quoting from the 2010 Supreme Court decision in Holland v. Marshall (I've put the key elements in bold):

"[7] To succeed on an application pursuant to s. 18, the applicant must demonstrate:

1. that the proceedings are vexatious in the sense of having been taken in the absence of objectively reasonable ground; and

2. that proceedings have been brought habitually or persistently, such that the litigant has continued obstinately in the course of conduct, despite protests or criticism. (British Columbia) Public Guardian and Trustee v. Brown, 2002 BCSC 1152.

"[8] In Lang Michener v. Fabian ... the Ontario High Court described the characteristics of a typical vexatious proceeding:

(a) bringing one or more actions to decide an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction;

(b) where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief;

(c) actions brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment or oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;

(d) grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings;

(e) failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings;

(f) persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions; and

(g) in determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action."

After a relatively succinct review of the lengthy history of proceedings, the judge said this:

"It is as apparent to me ... that the respondents have persisted in bringing 'a raft of doomed applications'. They have done so in the face of clear judicial pronouncements, directions or advice explaining the lack of jurisdiction of this court to set aside final orders or to revisit issues that have already been decided. ...

"It is apparent to me that in the face of the judicial criticism, advice and direction the respondents will simply continue to bring applications in this proceeding which have no objective or reasonable basis. They are acting habitually and persistently in the face of judicial direction and criticism."

As you might expect from concluding comments like these, the credit union obtained the order sought.

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Practical Tips for Dealing with the Application Prone Litigant

A disproportionately small number of litigants are responsible for a surprisingly large amount of litigation. These high-conflict couples, usually estimated at five to ten percent of the divorcing population, will find themselves in court on dozen or more chambers applications before trial, and back in court on a half-dozen or more chambers applications after trial.

The problem for people stuck on the receiving end of a plague of applications is that they must reply to each and every application or risk a judgment being made in default and, if they have lawyers, the cost can be crippling. Unfortunately there's no rule of court that screens out hopeless applications or puts a limit on the number of applications that can be made. Here are some options.

Costs, costs and more costs

"Costs" are a financial penalty usually awarded against the party whose position was the most unrealistic or most unreasonable in a court action. (Costs aren't a lawyer's bill, it's an amount calculated using the formula set out in Appendix B of the Supreme Court Family Rules.) Costs can also be awarded for applications made in the course of a court action.

Most of the time, the costs of applications are determined when costs of the court action are being decided. However, under Rule 16-1 the court can make an order about costs when an application has been heard and make an order that they be payable right away. Rule 16-1(13) also allows a party's conduct to be taken in account when determining costs:

If anything is done or omitted improperly or unnecessarily, by or on behalf of a party, the court or a registrar may order

(a) that any costs arising from or associated with any matter related to the act or omission not be allowed to the party, or

(b) that the party pay the costs incurred by any other party by reason of the act or omission.

It's fairly rare for costs to awarded right away for family law applications. If the court believes that the applicant is acting in good faith and has reasonably brought his or her application, the court will usually say nothing about costs, leave it to the trial judge to make a decision about costs, or say that the person who is ultimately most successful when the court action is determined will have his or her costs of the application (called "costs in the cause"). Where the applicant has obviously been unreasonable or brought his or her application in bad faith, however, the court may order that:

1. the application respondent have his or her costs of the application no matter what happens with the trial (called "costs in any event of the cause");
2. the application respondent have his or her costs of the application payable right away; or,
3. the applicant pay a fixed amount as costs to the application respondent right away (called "lump-sum costs").

Lump-sum costs are the most punitive because they require the money to be paid right away, not when the trial has come to an end. At the other end of the spectrum are awards of costs in the cause, which are hardly punitive at all.

When it comes to dealing with someone who's application prone and unreasonable, you need to start keeping a list of the dates you've been in court and orders the other side was asking for.

• Assuming you're successful, you need to start asking for your costs of each application in any event of the cause.
• When it's your second or third application on more or less the same subject, you need to start complaining about how often the other side has dragged you into court and ask for your costs of each application payable right away.
• When you can prove that the other side is acting in bad faith or intentionally wasting your time, you need to ask for your costs of the application in a fixed lump-sum payable right away.

If the court has made a lump-sum costs award that the other side hasn't paid, you can raise the outstanding costs order as an initial objection to any further applications.

Ask the judge to seize him- or herself of the case

When a judge "seizes" him- or herself of a case, it means that the judge will be the only judge to hear all future applications until the case goes to trial or the judge has finally had enough. (Judges who seize themselves of applications like this usually won't hear the trial of the action.) This can be very handy because it means that the judge will learn all about the other side's issues in fairly short order, and hopefully get a bit jaded about the urgency of every new application. Otherwise, particularly in larger centres like Vancouver, Victoria and New Westminster, there's a good chance that each application will be heard by a new judge, giving the other side a change to make his or her pitch afresh.

Many judges are understandably reluctant to seize themselves of applications like this. It can be very difficult and very time consuming, and often require the judge to make him- or herself available to hear an application on short notice or while engaged in something else like a trial. When a judge will seize him- or herself of a file, however, it's an absolutely wonderful thing.

When it comes to dealing with someone who's application prone and it's clear that there's no end in sight to the number of applications you're going to have to deal with, you need to start asking the judges who are hearing the other side's applications if they will consider seizing themselves of further applications brought in the action. Although you should expect to be turned down, if you don't ask it'll never happen.

Ask for an order that permission be obtained for further applications

Finally, s. 18 of the Supreme Court Act says this:

If, on application by any person, the court is satisfied that a person has habitually, persistently and without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious legal proceedings in the Supreme Court or in the Provincial Court against the same or different persons, the court may, after hearing that person or giving him or her an opportunity to be heard, order that a legal proceeding must not, without leave of the court, be instituted by that person in any court.

In other word, if you can show that the other side has persistently brought unreasonable applications against you, you may be able to ask the court for an order that he or she not bring any further applications without first getting permission from a judge. Similar orders may be made by case management judges or the judge hearing a Judicial Case Conference.

This really is a heavy hammer, and the court won't make an order like this unless it is clear that someone really is behaving unreasonably and capriciously. Don't expect the court to make this sort of order lightly, and don't ask for it without getting advise from a lawyer first. The last thing you want is to come across as over-the-top as the other party!

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Alberta Associate Chief Justice Releases Dissertation on Maverick Litigants

Associate Chief Justice Rooke of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench has just published his decision in Meads v. Meads. This decision is remarkable and should be, I suggest, required reading for judges, lawyers, court administrators and court clerks across the country.

The judgment in Meads is a treatise, a manifesto and a cri de coeur addressing a certain sort of disaffected, maverick litigant which has been clogging up Canada's courts with contrived, pseudolegal arguments and irrational, histrionic demands for a number of years. Mr. Justice Rooke's judgment identifies, analyses and deconstructs the arguments of vexatious litigants variously known as Detaxers, Freemen or Freemen-on-the-Land, Sovereign Men or Sovereign Citizens, members of the Church of the Ecumenical Redemption International and Moorish Law adherents, and makes recommendations as to how the court should manage such litigants.

The common theme among these groups of litigants, who Mr. Justice Rooke collectively refers to as "Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument litigants," is that they believe themselves to be privy to some secret legal principles which allow them to evade the normal rules and regulations that bind every other member of civil society. These people — and I have encountered them in my practice — drape themselves in cobbled-together pseudolegal verbiage and concepts, such as describing themselves as "corporate entities" or "juristic persons," claiming copyright over their own names and spelling their names with add-on hyphens and colons (the husband in the case before Mr. Justice Rooke, for example, referred to himself as "::Dennis-Larry:Meads::"), and filing bogus pseudolegal documents festooned with gibberish and meaningless symbols, such as thumbprints, multicoloured ink, pompous phrases set in capital letters, stamps and references to inapplicable, foreign or repealed statutes. Mr. Justice Rooke describes a number of improbable hypotheses common to these litigants, including:

1. that the Canada Revenue Agency has tricked persons into believing there is an obligation to pay tax;
2. that various deficiencies in judicial oaths prohibit court action;
3. that the relationship between the state and a person is a contract which one can opt out of;
4. that legislation, the common-law, and court principles and procedures are trumped by divinely ordained rules and principles;
5. that taxes and civil liabilities only attach to a “corporate name” and not physical persons;
6. that the courts have no power over litigants until they surrender to the courts; 
7. that state actors require the consent of persons, any state activity without consent is oppression; and,
8. that public notaries possess a judge-like authority that displaces the authority of Canadian courts.

After an exhaustive review of the many cases across Canada dealing with these and other favourite arguments, Mr. Justice Rooke concludes that the theories of Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument litigants have never gained purchase in a Canadian court.

Mr. Justice Rooke goes on to point out certain common linguistic, documentary, analytic and behavioural hallmarks of these litigants, and suggests a number of procedural devices that can be employed by the courts to manage and curb their excesses.

Court Staff:

1. Reject documents and materials that do not conform to established standards.
2. Mark non-compliant materials as "received" rather than "filed."
3. Forward potentially non-compliant materials to a judicial officer for review before filing.

The Judiciary:

1. Strike actions, applications and defences that are frivolous or vexatious.
2. Award punitive damages where the litigant's conduct is high-handed, abusive or oppressive.
3. Award elevated costs in favour of opposing parties to off-set their increases legal expenses resulting from the litigant's conduct.
4. Make orders that the litigant post security for costs at an early stage of the litigation.
5. Adopt tight approach to case management and assign a single judge to manage the case through to trial.
6. Consider whether the character and nature of the litigation warrants a finding that the litigant is frivolous and vexatious and should be barred from commencing further proceedings without leave.
7. Restrict who may appear as a representative or agent of the litigant.

It isn't particularly difficult to extrapolate from these comments principles of use to lawyers and self-represented parties dealing with such litigants. May I suggest:

Lawyers:

1. Apply to the chief justice for an order appointing a case management judge early on.
2. Consider whether the litigant's claim or defence discloses a legitimate cause of action or defence and apply to strike if it does not.
3. Do not waste your client's money replying to nonsensical pleading or applications in the same voluminous manner as the litigant's material, consider applying for directions.
4. Consider applying for security for costs, bearing in mind the generally high threshold that must be reached before such orders will be made. Search for other reported cases involving the same litigant.
5. Carefully scrutinize the background and motivations of persons seeking approval to appear as a representative or agent, and object where the person is going to exacerbate the situation.

Finally, the concluding remarks of Mr. Justice Rooke deserve repetition:

[71] Dealing with an OPCA litigant is difficult and frustrating. The fact that they are almost always self-represented adds to the challenge. What is worse is if a [OPCA proselytizer] is directly involved. I anticipate most judges will not tolerate representation by these persons ... particularly if the judge understands the nature of the [proselytizer] and his activities. ... 

[72] Timely and cost-effective resolution of these disputes requires that an action be pared down to its legitimate substance. That can be achieved by applications to strike irrelevant submissions and pleadings, and to categorize materials as irrelevant except for the purpose of costs, vexatious litigation and litigant status, and contempt and criminal sanction.

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